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We develop an account of the kind of deliberation that an agent that is doing planning or
executing high-level programs under incomplete information must be able to perform. The de-
liberator’s job is to produce a kind of plan that does not itself require deliberation to interpret.
We characterize these as epistemically feasible programs: programs for which the executing
agent, at every stage of execution, by virtue of what it knew initially and the subsequent read-
ings of its sensors, always knows what step to take next towards the goal of completing the
entire program. We formalize this notion and characterize deliberation in the situation cal-
culus based IndiGolog agent programming language in terms of it. We also show that for
certain classes of problems, which correspond to those with bounded solutions and those with
solutions without sensing, the search for epistemically feasible programs can be limited to
programs of a simple syntactic form. Finally, we discuss implementation issues and execution
monitoring and replanning too.
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1. Introduction
While a large amount of work on planning deals with issues of efﬁciency, a num-
ber of representational questions remain. This is especially true in applications where,
because of limitations on the information available at plan time, and quite apart from
computational concerns, no straight-line plan (that is, no linear sequence of actions) can
be demonstrated to achieve a goal. In very many cases, it is necessary to supplement
what is known at plan time by information that can only be obtained at run time via
sensing.
In cases like these, what should we expect a planner to do given a goal? We cannot
expect it to return a straight-line plan. We could get it to return a more general program260 S. Sardina et al. / On the semantics of deliberation in IndiGolog
of some sort, but we need to be careful: if the program is general enough, it may be as
challenging to ﬁgure out how to execute it as it was to achieve the goal in the ﬁrst place.
This is certainly true for situation calculus high-level programming languages in
the family of Golog [4,17,25]. These logic languages offer an interesting alternative to
planning in which the user speciﬁes not just a goal, but also constraints on how it is to
be achieved, perhaps leaving small sub-tasks to be handled by an automatic planner. In
that way, a high-level program serves as a “guide” heavily restricting the search space.
robot, tests involve domain-dependent ﬂuents affected by these actions, and the code
may contain nondeterministic choice points. Instead of looking for a legal sequence of
actions achieving somegoal, the (planning) task now istoﬁndasequence thatconstitutes
a legal execution of a high-level program.
At its most basic, planning should be a form of deliberation, whose purpose is to
produce a speciﬁcation of the desired behavior, a speciﬁcation which should not itself
require deliberation to interpret. In [15], it was suggested that a planner’s job was to
return a robot program, a syntactically-deﬁned structure that a robot could follow while
consulting its sensors to determine a conditional course of action. Other forms of con-
ditional plans have been proposed, for example, in [1,11,21,30]. What these all have in
common, is that they deﬁne plans as syntactically restricted programs.
In this paper, we consider a different and more abstract version of plans. We pro-
pose to treat plans as epistemically feasible programs: programs for which the executing
agent, at every stage of execution, by virtue of what it knew initially and the subse-
quent readings of its sensors, always knows what step to take next towards the goal of
completing the entire program.
This paper will not present algorithms for generating epistemically feasible pro-
grams. What we will do, however, is characterize the notion formally, prove that certain
cases of syntactically restricted programs are epistemically feasible, and that in some
cases where there is an epistemically feasible program, a syntactically restricted one that
has the same outcome can also be derived.
To make these concepts precise, it is useful to consider a framework where we can
talk about the planning and execution of very general agent programs involving sens-
ing and acting. IndiGolog [5] is a variant of Golog intended to be executed online in
an incremental way. Because of this incremental style execution, an agent program is
capable of gathering new information from the world during its execution. Most rel-
evant for our purposes is that IndiGolog includes a search operator which allows it to
only take a step if it can convince itself that the step will allow it to eventually com-
plete some user-speciﬁed subprogram. In that way, IndiGolog provides an attractive
integrated account of sensing, planning, and action. However, IndiGolog search does
not guarantee that it will not get stuck in a situation where it knows that some step can
be performed, but does not know which. It is this search operator that we will generalize
here.
Our proposed account of deliberation is important to the area of agent program-
ming languages (e.g., 3APL [10], AgentSpeak(L) [23], etc.). So far most such languages
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tions are the temporal logic-based Concurrent MetateM [9] and the ﬂuent calculus-based
FLUX [32,33]). But many agent applications would beneﬁt from planning, especially if
incomplete knowledge and sensing were handled (e.g., web service composition).
Toillustrate the discussion, we will use a simple example taken from [15]: an agent
wants to get on a ﬂight at the airport; however, the agent does not know in advance which
gate it must go to; it must acquire this information after it has arrived at the airport, and
then proceed to the gate. To perform planning to solve this problem, one could give
IndiGolog the following program to execute:
getOnFlightSketchy
def =  

achieve(OnPlane(Flight123),True)

where
achieve(Goal,GoodSit)
def =
while¬Goal do
πa[a;GoodSit(now)?]
endwhile
Here, achieve(Goal,GoodSit) is a completely general nondeterministic program schema
that keeps choosing an action a nondeterministically and executing it for as long as the
goal does not hold (GoodSit is a predicate on situations that can be used to constrain
the search, but in our example this is not used.) We use an appropriate instance of this
schema, achieve(OnPlane(Flight123),True), set within the scope of the search operator
 , to direct IndiGolog to search for a plan that is guaranteed to lead to a situation where
the program given can successfully terminate, i.e., where the agent is on its ﬂight. This
works provided an adequate axiomatization of the airport domain has been given, which
we do in the next section.
We can contrast this very sketchy nondeterministic program with the following
one that is completely detailed and determinate (we assume that the airport has only two
gates):
getOnFlightDetailed
def = go(Airport);
checkDepartures; % sensing action
if Parked(Flight123,GateA) then
go(GateA);board(Flight123)
else
go(GateB);board(Flight123)
endif
This program could have been deﬁned by the user, or it could have been returned by the
planner. Note that without the sensing action checkDepartures, the plan cannot be exe-
cuted since it will not be epistemically feasible anymore! One could also use a program
that is less speciﬁc than the above but more speciﬁc than the ﬁrst, for instance, one that262 S. Sardina et al. / On the semantics of deliberation in IndiGolog
directs the agent to ﬁrst achieve being at the airport, then achieve knowing what gate the
ﬂight is at, and then achieve being on the ﬂight. The point is that the programmer gets to
control how much search the interpreter must do. We will return to this example later on.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, in section 2 we set the stage
by presenting the situation calculus and high-level programs based on it. In section 3,
since we are going to make a speciﬁc use of the knowledge operator for characterizing
the program returned by the deliberator, we introduce epistemically accurate theories
and some of their basic properties with respect to reasoning. In section 4, we char-
acterize epistemically feasible deterministic programs, i.e., the kind of programs that
we consider suitable results of the deliberation process, and in section 5, we study two
notable subclasses of epistemically feasible deterministic programs that can be char-
acterized in terms of syntax only. In section 6, we discuss how some of the abstract
notions we have introduced can be readily implemented in practice. In section 7, we
discuss how the deliberated program could be monitored and revised if circumstances
require it. Finally, in section 8, we draw conclusions and discuss related and future
work.
2. The situation calculus and IndiGolog
The technical machinery we use to deﬁne program execution in the presence of
sensing is based on that of [4,5]. The starting point in the deﬁnition is the situation
calculus [18]. We will not go over the language here except to note the following com-
ponents: there is a special constant S0 used to denote the initial situation, namely that
situation in which no actions have yet occurred; there is a distinguished binary function
symbol do where do(a,s) denotes the successor situation to s resulting from perform-
ing the action a; relations whose truth values vary from situation to situation, are called
(relational) ﬂuents, and are denoted by predicate symbols taking a situation term as their
last argument; and there is a special predicate Poss(a,s) used to state that action a is
executable in situation s. Actions may be ordinary physical actions though which the
agent changes its environment or sensing actions through which he acquires new infor-
mation.1 In this paper, we only deal explicitly with sensing actions with binary outcomes
as in [15]. However, the results presented here can be easily generalized to sensors with
multiple outcomes. We use a predicate SF(a,s) to characterize what the action tells the
agent about the environment. For a sensing action senseφ that senses the truth value of
φ, we would have [SF(senseφ,s) ≡ φ(s)], and for any ordinary action a that does not
involve sensing, we would have [SF(a,s) ≡ True]. We assume that SF(a,s) holds if
and only if action a returns the binary sensing result 1 in situation s. When the agent
performs a sensing action a in situation s, its knowledge base/theory will be expanded
with either SF(a,s) or its negation.
1 We assume that actions can only take objects as arguments and not other actions. We can use encodings
of actions to implement the latter case.S. Sardina et al. / On the semantics of deliberation in IndiGolog 263
Within this language, we can formulate domain theories which describe how the
world changes as the result of the available actions. One possibility is an action theory
D of the following form (see [25] for details):
− Dap is the set of action precondition axioms, one for each primitive action type A(  x)
of the form Poss(A(  x),s) ≡ ψA(  x,s), characterizing Poss.
− Dss is the set of successor state axioms, one for each ﬂuent F, stating under what
conditions F(  x,do(a,s)) holds as a function of what holds in situation s; these take
the place of effect axioms, but also provide a solution to the frame problem [24].
− Dsf is the set of sensed ﬂuent axioms, one for each primitive action type A(  x)of the
form SF(A(  x),s) ≡ φA(  x,s), characterizing SF [15].
− Duna is the set of unique names axioms for the primitive actions.
− DS0 is the set of axioms describing the initial situation S0.
− Some foundational, domain independent axioms [25].
For our airport example, we could use the following action theory:2
− Precondition axioms:
Poss(go(x),s) ≡ x = Airport ∨ At(Airport,s),
Poss(board(p),s) ≡∃ x.Parked(p,x,s)∧ At(x,s),
Poss(checkDepartures) ≡ At(Airport,s).
− Successor state axioms:
At(x,do(a,s)) ≡ a = go(x) ∨ At(x,s) ∧¬ ∃ ya = go(y),
OnPlane(p,do(a,s)) ≡ a = board(p) ∨ OnPlane(p,s),
Parked(p,x,do(a,s)) ≡ Parked(p,x,s).
− Sensed ﬂuent axioms:
SF(go(x),s) ≡ TRUE, SF(board(p),s) ≡ TRUE,
SF(checkDepartures,s)≡ Parked(Flight123,GateA,s).
− Initial state: At(x,S0) ≡ x = Home, ∀x.¬OnPlane(x,S0).
To describe a run which includes both actions and their sensing results, we use the
notion of a history. A history is a sequence of pairs (a,µ) where a is a primitive action
and µ is 1 or 0, a sensing result. Intuitively, the history σ = (a1,µ 1) ·····(an,µ n) is
one where actions a1,...,a n happen starting in some initial situation, and each action
ai returns sensing value µi. The empty history with no action is represented with ε,a n d
we assume that if ai is an ordinary action with no sensing, then µi = 1. For example, in
the airport domain,
σ1 = (go(Airport),1) · (checkDepartures,0) · (go(GateB),1)
would be a possible history, where the agent ﬁrst goes to the airport, then senses the
departure screen and gets a sensing result of 0, meaning that the ﬂight is not at gate A,
and then goes to gate B.
2 We omit here Duna and an axiom saying that gate A and gate B are the only gates.264 S. Sardina et al. / On the semantics of deliberation in IndiGolog
We use end[σ] as an abbreviation for the situation term called the end situation
of history σ on the initial situation S0, and deﬁned inductively by: end[ε]=S0;a n d
end[σ · (a,µ)]=do(a,end[σ]). So, for example:
end[σ1]=do

go(GateB),do

checkDepartures,do(go(Airport),S0)

.
We also use Sensed[σ] as an abbreviation for a formula of the situation calculus
expressing the sensing results of history σ, and it is deﬁned inductively by: Sensed[ε]=
True;a n dSensed[σ · (a,1)]=Sensed[σ]∧SF(a,end[σ]),a n dSensed[σ · (a,0)]=
Sensed[σ]∧¬ SF(a,end[σ]). This formula uses SF to state what must be true for the
sensing to come out as speciﬁed by σ starting in S0. So, for example, Sensed[σ1] stands
for:
SF(go(Airport),S0)∧
¬SF

checkDepartures,do(go(Airport),S0)

∧
SF

go(GateB),do

checkDepartures,do(go(Airport),S0)

which is equivalent to ¬Parked(Flight123,GateA).
Next we turn to programs. The programs we consider here are based on the Con-
Golog language deﬁned in [4], which provides a rich set of programming constructs
summarized below:
α, primitive action;
φ?, wait for a condition;
p1;p2, sequence;
p1 | p2, nondeterministic branch;
πx.p(x), nondeterministic choice of argument;
p∗, nondeterministic iteration;
if φ then p1 else p2 endif, conditional;
while φ do p endwhile, while loop;
p1   p2, concurrency with equal priority;
p1  p2, concurrency with p1 at a higher priority;
p||, concurrent iteration;
   x: φ(  x) → p , interrupt;
p(  θ). procedure call.3
Among these constructs, we notice the presence of nondeterministic constructs. These
include (p1 | p2), which nondeterministically chooses between programs p1 and p2,
πx.p(x), which nondeterministically picks a binding for the variable x and performs the
program p(x) for this binding of x,a n dp∗, which performs p zero or more times. Also
notice that ConGolog includes constructs for dealing with concurrency. In particular
(p1   p2) expresses the concurrent execution (interpreted as interleaving) of programs
p1 and p2. Beside construct (p1   p2), ConGolog includes other constructs for dealing
with concurrency, such as prioritized concurrency (p1  p2), and interrupts    x: φ(  x) →
p . We refer the reader to [4] for a detailed account of ConGolog.
3 For the sake of simplicity, we will not consider procedures in this paper.S. Sardina et al. / On the semantics of deliberation in IndiGolog 265
In [4], a single step transition semantics in the style of [22] is deﬁned for ConGolog
programs. Two special predicates Trans and Final are introduced. Trans(p,s,p ,s )
means that by executing program p starting in situation s, one can get to situation s  in
one elementary step with the program p  remaining to be executed, that is, there is a
possible transition from the conﬁguration (p,s) to the conﬁguration (p ,s ). Final(p,s)
means that program p may successfully terminate in situation s, i.e., the conﬁguration
(p,s) is ﬁnal.4
Ofﬂine executions of programs, which are the kind of executions originally pro-
posed for Golog and ConGolog [17,4], are characterized using the Do(p,s,s ) predi-
cate, which means that there is an execution of program p that starts in situation s and
terminates in situation s :
Do(p,s,s
 )
def =∃ p
 .Trans
∗(p,s,p
 ,s
 ) ∧ Final(p
 ,s
 ),
where Trans∗ is the reﬂexive transitive closure of Trans,d e ﬁ n e db y
Trans∗(p,s,p ,s )
def =∀ T[···⊃T(p,s,p  ,s )],
where the ellipsis stands for the conjunction of (the universal closure of)
T(p,s,p,s)
Trans(p1,s 1,p 2,s 2) ∧ T(p 2,s 2,p 3,s 3) ⊃ T(p 1,s 1,p 3,s 3).
From now on, D will denote the set of axioms deﬁning an underlying theory of
action, T will denote the set of axioms for Trans and Final,a n dE will stand for the set
of axioms needed for the encoding of programs as ﬁrst-order terms (see [4]). An ofﬂine
execution of program p from situation s is a sequence of actions a1,...,a n such that:
D ∪ T ∪ E |= Do

p,s,do(an,...,do(a1,s))

.
Observe that an ofﬂine executor is in fact similar to a planner that given a program, a
starting situation, and a theory describing the domain, produces a sequence of action to
execute in the environment. In doing this, it has no access to sensing results, which will
only be available at runtime.
In [5], IndiGolog, an extension of ConGolog that deals with online executions with
sensing is developed. We say that a conﬁguration, this time formed by a program and
4 For example, the transition requirements for sequence are
Trans([p1;p2],s,p ,s ) ≡
Final(p1,s)∧ Trans(p2,s,p ,s ) ∨∃ q .Trans(p1,s,q ,s ) ∧ p  = (q ;p2)
i.e., to single-step the program (p1;p2), either p1 terminates and we single-step p2, or we single-step
p1 leaving some q ,a n d(q ;p2) is what is left of the sequence. Note that since Trans and Final take
programs (that include test of formulas) as arguments, this requires encoding formulas and programs as
terms; see [4] for the details. For notational simplicity, we suppress this encoding and use programs as
terms directly.266 S. Sardina et al. / On the semantics of deliberation in IndiGolog
a history, (p,σ) may evolve to conﬁguration (p ,σ ) w.r.t. a model M of D ∪ T ∪ E ∪
{Sensed[σ]} if and only if5
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σi]} |= Trans(p,end[σ],p ,end[σ ])
and
σ  =
σ if end[σ ]=end[σ],
σ · (a,1) if end[σ ]=do(a,end[σ]) and M |= SF(a,end[σ]),
σ · (a,0) if end[σ ]=do(a,end[σ]) and M  |= SF(a,end[σ]).
Finally, we say that a conﬁguration (p,σ) is ﬁnal whenever
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Final(p,end[σ]).
We now deﬁne several kinds of online executions. A non-terminating online ex-
ecution of an IndiGolog program p starting from a history σ w.r.t. a model M of
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} is an inﬁnite sequence of online conﬁgurations (p0 = p,
σ0 = σ),(p1,σ 1),..., such that conﬁguration (pi,σ i) may evolve to conﬁguration
(pi+1,σ i+1) w.r.t. model M for every i  0.
On the other hand, a terminating online execution of an IndiGolog program p
starting from a history σ w.r.t. a model M of D∪T ∪E∪{Sensed[σ]} is a ﬁnite sequence
of online conﬁgurations (p0 = p,σ0 = σ),...,(p n,σ n) such that conﬁguration (pi,σ i)
may evolve to conﬁguration (pi+1,σ i+1) w.r.t. model M for every 0  i  n − 1, and
either (pn,σ n) is a ﬁnal conﬁguration or (pn,σ n) is not a ﬁnal conﬁguration and there is
no conﬁguration (p ,σ ) to which (pn,σ n) may evolve to w.r.t. M. In the former case,
we say that the online execution successfully terminates; in the latter case, we say that
the online execution is stuck or has reached a dead-end. Finally, we say that an online
execution is complete if it is either a non-terminating or a terminating execution.
The following lemma says that the model used to generate sensing outcomes is
always a model of the theory at every step of the online execution.
Lemma 1. If (p0 = p,σ0 = σ),...,(p n,σ n) is an online execution of program p at σ
w.r.t.amodelM ofD∪T ∪E∪{Sensed[σ]},t h e nM isamodelofD∪T ∪E∪{Sensed[σi]},
for all 0  i  n.
Proof. Trivial since M is a model of D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} and every sentence
SF(A,S) added to such set at every online step, where A is an ground action term and S
is a ground action term, is also satisﬁed by M. 
5 This deﬁnition is more general than the one in [5], where the sensing results were assumed to come from
the actual environment rather than from a model (models can represent any possible environment). Also,
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So for the example program getOnFlightDetailed, we would have the following tree
of online executions:
Depending on the result of the checkDepartures sensing action, the theory gets updated
differently and different online executions ensue.
There is no automatic lookahead in IndiGolog. Instead, a search operator  (p) is
introduced to allow the programmer to specify when lookahead should be performed.
Final and Trans are deﬁned for the new operator as follows. For Final,w es i m p l yh a v e
that ( (p),s) is a ﬁnal conﬁguration of the program if (p,s) itself is, i.e.,
Final

 (p),s

≡ Final(p,s).
For Trans, we have that the conﬁguration ( (p),s) can evolve to ( (q ),s ) provided
that (p,s) can evolve to (q ,s ) and from (q ,s ) it is possible to reach a ﬁnal conﬁgura-
tion in a ﬁnite number of transitions, i.e.,
Trans

 (p),s,p
 ,s
 
≡∃ q
 ,s f.p
  =  (q
 ) ∧ Trans(p,s,q
 ,s
 ) ∧ Do(q
 ,s
 ,s f).
This semantics means that the set of axioms D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} entails
Trans( (p),end[σ], (p ),s ) if and only if it entails Trans(p,end[σ],p ,s ) as well
as ∃sf.Do(p ,s ,s f). Thus, with this deﬁnition, the axioms entail that a step of the pro-
gram can be performed provided that they entail that this step can be extended into a
complete execution (i.e., in all models). This prunes executions that are bound to fail
later on. However, it does not guarantee that the executor will not get stuck in a situation
where it knows that some transition can be performed, but does not know which. For
example, consider the program (a;if φ then b else c) | d, where all actions are always
possible, but where the agent does not know whether φ holds after a.T h e r e a r e t w o
possible ﬁrst steps, d which terminates successfully, and a after which the executor is
stuck. Unfortunately,   does not distinguish between the two cases, since even in the
latter, there does exist an (unknown) transition to a ﬁnal state. We address this problem
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3. Epistemically accurate theories
As mentioned in the introduction, our account of deliberation is based on the agent
ﬁnding a plan which is an epistemically feasible program, a program for which the agent
always knows what step to do next. To formalize this notion, we will use action theories
that are extended with a knowledge operator. Our goal in introducing knowledge is
only to be able to refer in the language to what the agent knows after a sequence of
sensing actions (which we did metatheoretically in the previous section). So we only
consider theories that areepistemically accurate, meaning that, among other things, what
is known accurately reﬂects what the theory says about the dynamic system.6
To represent knowledge in the language, we follow [15,20,29] and use a ﬂuent
K(s ,s)to specify which situations s  are considered epistemically possible by the agent
in situation s. Know(φ(now),s) is then taken to be an abbreviation for the formula
∀s .K(s ,s)⊃ φ(s ).
First, we introduce the notion of objective formula (cf. [25, chapter 11]). Intu-
itively, an objective formula on a situation term s is one that only talks about the world
(not the knowledge of it) in the situation s. Formally, objective formulas on situation
term s are inductively deﬁned as follows:7
− If F(  t,s)is a relational atom, then F(  t,s)is an objective formula on s.
− If t1, t2 are terms not of sort situation (that is, object, action or program terms), then
t1 = t2 is an objective formula on s.
− If φ1 and φ2 are objective formulas on s then so are ¬φ1, φ1 ∧ φ2,a n d∃xφ1,w h e r e
x is a variable not of sort situation.
For simplicity, we shall sometimes say that φ(s)is an objective formula, when we
actually mean that φ(s) is an objective formula on s. Note that neither Trans nor Final
can be mentioned in objective formulas.
Epistemically accurate theories are theories as introduced earlier, but with the fol-
lowing additional constraints:
1. The initial situation is characterized by an axiom of the form Know(ψ0(now),S0),
that is, DS0 ={ Know(ψ0(now),S0)},w h e r eψ0(s) is an objective formula. Note that
there can be ﬂuents about which nothing is known in the initial situation.
2. Every sensing axiom SF(A(  x),s) ≡ ψ(  x,s) is such that ψ(  x,s) is an objective
formula.
3. Every precondition axiom Poss(A(  x),s) ≡ ψ(  x,s) is such that ψ(  x,now) is an
objective formula.
6 In [26] and [25, chapter 11], a similar notion is used to deal with knowledge-based programs and reduce
knowledge to provability.
7 Notice that, in contrast to [25], our objective formulas include equality between program terms. Also,
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4. The set of successor state axioms Dss includes the following successor state axiom
for the knowledge ﬂuent K [29]:
K

s  ,do(a,s)

≡∃ s .s  = do(a,s ) ∧ K(s ,s)∧

SF(a,s ) ≡ SF(a,s)

.
All other successor state axioms F(  x,do(a,s)) ≡ ψ(  x,a,s)are such that ψ(  x,a,s)
is an objective formula.
5. There is an axiom KInit stating that the accessibility relation K is, at least, reﬂexive in
the initial situation, which is then propagated to all situations by the successor state
axiom for K [29].
6. There are no functional ﬂuents and no non-ﬂuent relations except for equality,   and
Poss.8
7. Duna ∪{ ψ0(S0)} decides all equality sentences not mentioning any program term
or any program variable, that is, for any sentence over the language of the theory
whose only predicate symbol is equality and such that β mentions no program term
or variable, Duna ∪{ ψ0(S0)}| =β or Duna ∪{ ψ0(S0)}| =¬ β.
8. There are a ﬁnite number of action types A1(   x1),...,A n(   xn), and the agent knows
this. Formally,
{ψ0(S0)}| =∀ a.

∃  x1.a = A1(   x1) ∨···∨∃  xn.a = An(   xn)

.
9. There are domain closure and unique name axioms for objects, and the agent knows
this. Formally,
{ψ0(S0)}| =∀x.

∀R.

R(0) ∧

∀y.R(y) ⊃ R(ς(y))

⊃ R(x)

,
{ψ0(S0)}| =∀x.0  = ς(x)∧∀ x1x2.ς(x1) = ς(x2) ⊃ x1 = x2.
This forces the object domain to be isomorphic to the countably inﬁnite set of stan-
dard names 0,ς(0),ς(ς(0)),... (see [16]).9
Observe that because of assumption 7, whenever we have a program of the form
πa.p(a),w h e r ea is an action, we can rewrite it (without loss of generality) as program
π   x1.p(A1(   x1))|...|π.  xn.p(An(   xn)) assuming A1,...,A n are all the action types avail-
able. This shows that we do not need to deal with existential quantiﬁcation over action
variables, since we can replace nondeterministic choice of action by a nondeterminis-
tic branch over all the available action types. It should be clear that any action theory
of the form speciﬁed in section 2 that satisﬁes restrictions 6–9 can be transformed into
an epistemically accurate theory. Note that we shall also require that tests appearing in
programs be objective formulas that do not mention program terms.
8 Note that, it is straightforward to represent non-ﬂuent relations using “eternal” relational ﬂuents. Also,
functional ﬂuents can also represented using relational ﬂuents.
9 For simplicity, we assumed these sentences to be entailed by ψ0(S0), but, since they are situation-
independent sentences, they can very well be included in DS0 and not in ψ0(S0).270 S. Sardina et al. / On the semantics of deliberation in IndiGolog
From now on, we will restrict to particular types of theories D respecting the above
assumptions. First we show that every occurrence of Trans and Final can be substituted
by an equivalent objective formula.
Theorem 1. For any ConGolog program term p(  x) containing only variables   x of sort
object, there exist objective formulas φf(  x,s),φtt(  x,p ,s),a n dφta(  x,p ,a,s)contain-
ing no free variables other than the ones listed, not mentioning Trans, nor Final,a n d
such that:
D ∪ T ∪ E |= Final(p(  x),a,s)≡ φf(  x,s),
D ∪ T ∪ E |= Trans(p(  x),s,p
 ,s)≡ φtt(  x,p
 ,s),
D ∪ T ∪ E |= Trans(p(  x),s,p ,do(a,s)) ≡ φta(  x,p ,a,s).
Proof. See appendix.10 
Next, we show some basic properties of epistemically accurate theories that will
be used in the following. The ﬁrst says that if some objective property of the system is
entailed, then it is also known and vice-versa.
Theorem 2. Let φ(s)be an objective formula on situation s. Then,
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= φ(end[σ])
if and only if
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Know(φ(now),end[σ]).
Proof. See appendix. 
The next two results tell us that, in some sense, what we know about the agent’s
knowledge is “complete”.
Theorem 3. Let φi(s), i = 1..n be objective formulas on s. Then,
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |=
Know(φ1(now),end[σ]) ∨···∨Know(φn(now),end[σ])
if and only if D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Know(φk(now),end[σ]),f o rs o m e1 k  n.
Proof. See appendix. 
10 Remember that we are not allowing for recursive procedures in this paper.S. Sardina et al. / On the semantics of deliberation in IndiGolog 271
Theorem 4. Let φ(  x,s) be an objective formula on situation s with non-situation free
variables   x.T h e n
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= ∃  x.Know(φ(  x,now),end[σ])
if and only if there are ground terms   t such that
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Know(φ(  t,now),end[σ]).
Proof. See appendix. 
Finally, under some restrictions on what is known, we can combine the previous
two theorems into a single technical result.
Theorem 5. Let φ1(s), φ2(  x,s),a n dφ3(  y,s)be three objective formulas on s with non-
situation free variables   x and   y.I f
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |=
Know

φ1(now),end[σ]

∨
∃  x.Know

¬φ1(now) ∧ φ2(  x,now) ∧∀  y.¬φ3(  y,now),end[σ]

∨
∃  y.Know

¬φ1(now) ∧∀  x.¬φ2(  x,now) ∧ φ3(  y,now),end[σ]

then D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} entails one of the following closed formulas:
1. Know(φ1(now),end[σ]);
2. Know(φ2(  t2,now),end[σ]), for some ground terms   t2;
3. Know(φ3(  t3,now),end[σ]), for some ground terms   t3.
Proof. The theorem follows easily from lemma 7 in the appendix (section A.1), which
in turn uses theorems 3 and 4. 
Theorems 1, 4 and 5 will be used extensively in the coming section.
4. Deliberation program steps
We are going to introduce and semantically characterize the deliberation steps in
programs. The basic idea of the semantics we are going to develop is that the task
of the deliberator (that performs search) is, given a possible highly nondeterministic
program, to try to ﬁnd a deterministic program that is guaranteed to be “executable”
and constitutes a way to execute the original program, in the sense that it always leads
to terminating situations of the original program. Another way to look at this is that
the deliberator tries to identify a “strategy” for reaching a ﬁnal situation of the original
program. Insuch a strategy, allchoices mustbe resolved, i.e., thecorresponding program
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be used (e.g., to branch on). In doing this task, the deliberator performs essentially
the same task as the ofﬂine executor: it compiles the original program into a simpler
program that can be executed without any lookahead. The program it produces however,
is not just a linear sequence of actions; it can perform sensing, branching, iteration, etc.
Moreover, the program is checked to ensure that the executor will always have enough
information to continue the execution. Among other things, this addresses the problem
raised above concerning the original semantics of search: getting stuck because of lack
of knowledge on which transition to perform next. Note that our approach is similar to
that of [15]; however, there the strategy was stated in a completely different language
(robot programs), here we use ConGolog, i.e., the language used to program the agent
itself.
4.1. Epistemically feasible deterministic programs
The ﬁrst step in developing this approach is formalizing the notion mentioned
above of a deterministic program for which an executor will always have enough in-
formation to continue the execution, i.e., will always know what the next step to be
performed is. We capture this notion formally by deﬁning the class of epistemically
feasible deterministic programs (EFDPs) as follows:
EFDP(dp,s)
def =∀ dp ,s .Trans∗(dp,s,dp ,s ) ⊃ LEFDP(dp ,s ),
LEFDP(dp,s)
def =
Know

Final(dp,now) ∧¬ ∃ dp
 ,s
 .Trans(dp,now,dp
 ,s
 ),s

∨
∃dp .Know

¬Final(dp,now) ∧ UTrans(dp,now,dp ,now),s

∨
∃dp ,a.Know

¬Final(dp,now) ∧ UTrans(dp,now,dp ,do(a,now)),s

,
UTrans(dp,s,dp ,s )
def =
Trans(dp,s,dp ,s ) ∧∀ dp  ,s  .Trans(dp,s,dp  ,s  ) ⊃ dp   = dp  ∧ s   = s .
Thus to be an EFDP, a program must be such that all conﬁgurations reachable
from the initial program and situation are such that the program is a locally epistemically
feasible deterministic one (LEFDP). A program is an LEFDP in a situation if the agent
knows that it is currently Final and there are no further transitions possible, or it knows
what unique transition (with or without an action) it can perform next.
Ouroriginal detailed program for getting on aﬂight getOnFlightDetailed isan EFDP:
the agent knows what action it must do ﬁrst, go to the airport, then it knows what to do
next, check the departures screen, which will tell it which gate the ﬂight is at, and then
it knows it must go to that gate, board the ﬂight, and then knows that it is done. If we
delete the sensing action checkDepartures from the program, then we no longer have an
EFDP; the agent no longer knows what action to do next at the “if” test because it does
not know which gate the ﬂight is at and the “then” and “else” branches of the program
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First, observe that even though an epistemically feasible deterministic program is
not required to terminate, the agent is guaranteed to know what to do next at every step
in its execution. As a consequence of that, online executions of an epistemically feasible
deterministic program can never get to a conﬁguration where the agent does not know
what to do next and the execution is stuck.
Theorem 6. Let dp be such that D∪T ∪E ∪{Sensed[σ]} |= EFDP(dp,end[σ]). Then,
for each model M of D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]}, there is only one complete online exe-
cution of dp from σ w.r.t. M and this execution is either non-terminating or successfully
terminating.
Proof. Firstweshow, by contradiction, that for allmodels M of D∪T ∪E∪{Sensed[σ]}
all online executions of dp from σ w.r.t. M are either non-terminating or successfully
terminating.
Suppose there is a model M and an online execution that gets stuck in an online
conﬁguration (dpi,σ i) where neither Final nor Trans to some subsequent conﬁguration
is possible w.r.t. model M.T h i sm e a n st h a tD ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σi]}  |= Final(dpi,σ i)
and there there are no terms dpi+1 and σi+1 to which conﬁguration (dpi,σ i) can make a
transition w.r.t. M.
Now since we have an online execution w.r.t. M reaching conﬁguration (dpi,σ i),
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Trans∗(dp,end[σ],dpi,end[σi]) holds. Hence, since D ∪
T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= EFDP(dp,end[σ]),w eh a v et h a tD ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σi]} |=
LEFDP(dpi,end[σi]) and, thus, by deﬁnition of LEFDP,w eh a v e :
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σi]} |=
Know

Final(dpi,now) ∧¬ ∃ dp ,s Trans(dpi,now,dp ,s ),end[σi]

∨
∃dp
 Know

¬Final(dpi,now) ∧ UTrans(dpi,now,dp
 ,now),end[σi]

∨
∃dp ,aKnow

¬Final(dpi,now) ∧ UTrans(dpi,now,dp ,do(a,now)),end[σi]

.
By theorem 5, and the fact that it is possible to eliminate all references to Final and
Trans by equivalent objective formulas (due to theorem 1), it is possible to show that this
implies that one of the logical implications below must hold:
(a) D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σi]} |=
Know(Final(dpi,now) ∧¬ ∃ dp ,s Trans(dpi,now,dp ,s ),end[σi]);
(b) D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σi]} |=
∃dp
 .Know(¬Final(dpi,now) ∧ UTrans(dpi,now,dp
 ,now),end[σi]);
(c) D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σi]} |=
∃dp ,a.Know(¬Final(dpi,now) ∧ UTrans(dpi,now,dp ,do(a,now)),end[σi]).
Taking into account theorem 4, and again using theorem 1 to eliminate all references to
Trans and Final predicates, we have one of the following cases:
(a) D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σi]} |=
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(b) D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σi]} |= Know(UTrans(dpi,now,dp
 
,now),end[σi]),
for some ground program term dp
 
;
(c) D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σi]} |= Know(UTrans(dpi,now,dp
 
,do(¯ a,now)),end[σi]),
for some ground program term dp
 
and ground action term ¯ a.
Lastly, by reﬂexivity of K, one of the following cases applies:
(a) D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σi]} |= Final(dpi,end[σi]);
(b) D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σi]} |= UTrans(dpi,end[σi],dp
 
,end[σi]);
(c) D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σi]} |= UTrans(dpi,end[σi],dp
 
,do(¯ a,end[σi]).
In case (a), the conﬁguration (dpi,σ i) is a ﬁnal one. In case (b), the conﬁguration
(dpi,σ i) can make a legal non-action online execution step w.r.t. M to conﬁguration
(dp
 
,σ i). Finally, in case (c), the conﬁguration (dpi,σ i) can make a legal online step
to conﬁguration (dp
 
,σ i · (¯ a,µ)),w h e r eµ = 1i fM |= SF(¯ a,end[σi]),a n dµ = 0,
otherwise. Therefore, in all three cases conﬁguration (dpi,σ i) is not stuck, i.e., it is
either ﬁnal or it can evolve to another conﬁguration, thus getting a contradiction.
Next we show, also by contradiction, that for all models M of D ∪ T ∪ E ∪
{Sensed[σ]} there is only one complete execution of dp from σ w.r.t. M.
Assume that there are, at least, two different complete online executions EX1 and
EX2 of dp at σ w.r.t. a certain model M:
EX1 =(dp,σ),(dp
1
1,σ
1
1),...,
EX2 =(dp,σ),(dp2
1,σ2
1),....
As EX1 is different from EX2, then either EX1 is a preﬁx execution of EX2, EX2 is
a preﬁx execution of EX1,o rf o rs o m ei  1, (dp1
j,σ1
j ) = (dp2
j,σ2
j ) for all j<i ,
but (dp1
i,σ1
i )  = (dp2
i,σ2
i ). Clearly, EX1 (EX2) is not a complete execution in the ﬁrst
(second) case, because its last conﬁguration does have a transition and, given that it is a
local epistemically feasible conﬁguration, it can never be ﬁnal. Then, the only possible
case is the third one. However, in that case, we must have that:
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σi−1]}|=Trans

dp
1
i−1,end[σ
1
i−1],dp
1
i,end[σ
1
i ]

,
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σi−1]}|=Trans

dp2
i−1,end[σ2
i−1],dp2
i,end[σ2
i ]

,
where σi−1 = σ1
i−1 = σ2
i−1 and dpi−1 = dp
1
i−1 = dp
2
i−1. Because (dp
1
i,σ1
i )  = (dp
2
i,σ2
i ),
there is no unique transition from (dp1
i−1,σ1
i−1), formally,
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σi−1]} |= ¬∃dp
 ,s
 .UTrans

dpi−1,end[σi−1],dp
 ,s
 
. (1)
However, given that program dp is an EFDP at history σ, it is the case that D∪T ∪
E ∪{ Sensed[σi−1]} |= LEFDP(dpi−1,end[σi−1]). Observe that, by theorem 2, the agent
knows of the possible two transitions for (dpi−1,σ i−1) at σi−1, and, as dpi−1 is a LEFDP
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exists a ground program term dp
 
and a ground situation term ¯ s  (with ¯ s  = end[σi−1] or
¯ s  = do(¯ a,end[σi−1]) for some ground action term ¯ a), such that
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σi−1]} |= Know

UTrans(dpi−1,now,dp
 
, ¯ s
 ), end[σi−1]

.
Then, D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σi−1]} |= UTrans(dpi−1,end[σi−1],dp
 
, ¯ s ) follows by the
reﬂexivity of K, which contradicts (1). Thus, the third case is also not applicable, EX1
cannot be different from EX2, and there can only exist one complete execution of dp at
σ w.r.t. M. 
The next result shows that for epistemically feasible deterministic programs, if
the program can always reach a ﬁnal situation, then the program can be successfully
executed online whatever the sensing outcomes may be.
Theorem 7. Suppose D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= EFDP(dp,end[σ]) holds. Then,
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{Sensed[σ]} |= ∃sf.Do(dp,end[σ],s f) if and only if for each model M of
D ∪T ∪E ∪{Sensed[σ]}, the (only) complete online execution of dp from σ w.r.t. M is
successfully terminating.
Proof. ⇒ Due to theorem 6 we know that, in any model M, the (only) complete online
execution is either non-terminating or successful. We now prove by contradiction that it
cannot be non-terminating.
Suppose that, for some model M of D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]}, there is a non-
terminating online execution (dp0 = dp,σ 0 = σ),...,(dpn,σ n),.... Thus, M |=
Trans(dpi,end[σi],dpi+1,end[σi+1]) for any i  0. By theorem 2, together with the-
orem 1, the agent knows each of these transitions in M. Moreover given that dpi is a
LEFDP at σi in M (that is, M |= LEFDP(dpi,end[σi]),f o ra l li  0) the agent must
know that such transition is the only possible one and that the conﬁguration is not aﬁ n a l
one in M. From there, using reﬂexivity of K we conclude that, for all i  0,
M |= UTrans

dpi,end[σi],dpi+1,end[σi+1]

∧¬ Final(dpi,end[σi]).
In words, given that there is a transition from conﬁguration (dpi,end[σi]) to con-
ﬁguration (dpi+1,end[σi+1]),f o re v e r yi  0, plus the fact that each conﬁguration is a
LEFDP one, then that transition is the only one possible in M and (dpi,end[σi]) is not a
ﬁnal in M for any i  0, and, as a result, the following is true:
M |= ∀ dp
 ,s
 .Trans
∗
dp,end[σ],dp
 ,s
 
⊃¬ Final(dp
 ,s
 ).
It follows next that M |= ¬ ∃sf.Do(dp,end[σ],s f), which contradicts the initial state-
ment, and the non-terminating complete online execution cannot exists.
⇐ Due to theorem 6, there is only one complete online execution of dp at σ
w.r.t. model M; and, by assumption, such execution is successfully terminating. Then,
by lemma 1, M satisﬁes each step of the online execution, including the ﬁnal termi-
nating step. This is to say, formally, that M |= ∃dp
 ,s .Trans∗(dp,end[σ],dp
 ,s ) ∧
Final(dp ,s ) holds, or, what is the same, M |= ∃s .Do(dp,end[σ],s ) holds. 276 S. Sardina et al. / On the semantics of deliberation in IndiGolog
4.2. Semantics of deliberation steps
We now give the formal semantics of the deliberation steps. To denote these steps
in the program we introduce a deliberation operator  e, a new form of the IndiGolog
search operator discussed in section 2.
We deﬁne the Trans and Final predicates for the new deliberation operator as fol-
lows:
Trans( e(p),s,dp
 ,s
 ) ≡
∃dp.EFDP(dp,s)∧∃ sf.Trans(dp,s,dp ,s ) ∧ Do(dp ,s ,s f) ∧ Do(p,s,s f),
Final( e(p),s) ≡ Final(p,s).
Thus, the axioms entail that there is a transition for  e(p) from a situation s if and
only if they entail that there is some epistemically feasible deterministic program dp that
reaches a Final situation of the original program p no matter how sensing turns out (i.e.,
in every model of the axioms). Note also that the remaining program after the transition,
dp ,i sw h a ti sl e f to fdp; thus, the agent commits to the strategy/EFDP found in the
initial deliberation and executes it.11 Note that we do not need to put dp  inside a  e
block, since it is deterministic.
The following theorem shows that our semantics for the deliberation operator satis-
ﬁes some basic requirements: if there is a transition for a deliberation block in a history
σ, then (1) the program in the deliberation block can reach a Final situation in every
model, and (2) so can  e(p), and moreover (3)  e(p) can be successfully executed
online whatever the sensing results are (thus, the agent will never get to a (dead-end)
conﬁguration where it can no longer reach a Final situation or does not know what to do
next):
Theorem 8. If D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Trans( e(p),end[σ],p ,s ),t h e n
(1) D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= ∃sf.Do(p,end[σ],s f);
(2) D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= ∃sf.Do( e(p),end[σ],s f);
(3) For each model M of D∪T ∪E∪{Sensed[σ]} all online executions from ( e(p),σ)
w.r.t. M successfully terminate.
Proof. (1) and (2) follow immediately from the deﬁnition of Trans for  e. For (3) con-
sider that by the deﬁnition of Trans for  e, there exists a dp such that D ∪ T ∪ E ∪
{Sensed[σ]} entails both EFDP(dp,end[σ]) and ∃sf,p ,s .Trans(dp,end[σ],p ,s ) ∧
Do(p ,s ,s f). The conditions of theorem 7 are then satisﬁed, and, as a result, we have
that all online executions from (dp,σ)are successfully terminating. Since these include
all online executions from (p ,σ ) with end[σ ]=s , all online executions from (p ,σ )
must also be successfully terminating. Hence the thesis follows. 
11 We discuss how this commitment to a given “strategy” can be relaxed when we address execution moni-
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5. Syntax-based accounts of EFDPs
In general, deliberating to ﬁnd a way to execute a high-level program can be very
hard because it amounts to doing planning where the class of potential plans is very
general. It is thus natural to consider restricted classes of programs. Two particularly
interesting such classes are: (i) programs that do not perform sensing, which correspond
to conformant plans12 (see, e.g., [31]), and (ii) programs that are guaranteed to terminate
in a bounded number of steps (i.e., do not involve any form of cycles), which correspond
to conditional plans (see, e.g., [1,30]). We will show that for these two classes, one
can restrict one’s attention to simple syntactically-deﬁned classes of programs without
loss of generality. So if one is designing a deliberator/planner, one might want to only
consider programs from these classes.
5.1. Tree programs
Let us deﬁne the class of (sense-branch) tree programs TREE with the following
BNF rule:
dpt ::= nil|False?|a;dpt1|True?;dpt1|senseφ;if φ then dpt1 else dpt2
where a is any non-sensing action, and dpt1 and dpt2 are tree programs. This class in-
cludes conditional programs where one can only test acondition that has just been sensed
(trivial tests False?a n dTrue? are introduced for technical reasons). As one may expect,
whenever such a program is (physically) executable, it is also epistemically feasible –
the agent always knows what to do next. This is formalized in the next theorem.
Theorem 9. Let dpt be a tree program, i.e., dpt ∈ TREE. Then, for all histories σ,i fD∪
T ∪E ∪{Sensed[σ]} |= ∃sf.Do(dpt,end[σ],s f) holds, then D∪T ∪E ∪{Sensed[σ]} |=
EFDP(dpt,end[σ]), that is, program dpt is an EFDP at history σ.
Proof. By induction on the structure of dpt.
Base cases.F o rnil, it is known that nil is Final,s ot h a tD∪T ∪E∪{Sensed[σ]} |=
EFDP(nil,end[σ]) holds; for False?, the antecedent is false, so the thesis holds.
Inductive cases. Assume that the thesis holds for dpt1 and dpt2. Assume that
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= ∃sf.Do(dpt,end[σ],s f).
For dpt = a;dpt1: D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= ∃sf.Do(a;dpt1,end[σ],s f)
implies that D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= ∃sf.Do(dpt1,do(a,end[σ]),sf). Because
a is a non-sensing action, Dsf |= Sensed[σ · (a,1)]≡Sensed[σ],s ow eh a v et h a t
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪ Sensed[σ · (a,1)]| =∃ sf.Do(dpt1,end[σ · (a,1)],s f). By the induction
hypothesis, we have D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ · (a,1)]} |= EFDP(dpt1,end[σ · (a,1)]),
and, as a result, D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= EFDP(dpt1,do(a,end[σ]). The fact that
∃sf.Do(a;dpt1,end[σ],s f) logically follows from D∪T ∪E ∪{Sensed[σ]} (due to the
12 We remind the reader that conformant plans are sequences of actions that, even under incomplete infor-
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initial assumptions) implies that D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Poss(a,end[σ]) and this
must be actually known by the agent due to theorem 2, i.e., D ∪T ∪E ∪{Sensed[σ]} |=
Know(Poss(a,now),end[σ]). Therefore, we have that
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |=
Know

Trans(a;dpt1,now,dpt1,do(a,now)),end[σ]

.
It is also known, due to the form of dpt, that this is the only transition possible for
a;dpt1 and that this program is not ﬁnal. So D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} logically entails
LEFDP(a;dpt1,end[σ]). Then,
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= EFDP(a;dpt1,end[σ]).
For dpt = True?;dpt1: the argument is similar, but simpler since the test does not
change the situation.
For dpt = senseφ;if φ then dpt1 else dpt2: Suppose that the sensing action re-
turns 1 and let σ1 = σ · (senseφ,1). Given that, the initial assumption that D ∪ T ∪ E
∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= ∃sf.Do(dpt,end[σ],s f) implies that D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ1]}
|= ∃sf.Do(dpt1,end[σ1],s f). Thus, by the induction hypothesis, D ∪ T ∪ E ∪
{Sensed[σ1]} |= EFDP(dpt1,end[σ1]) holds. It follows next that
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |=
φ

do(senseφ,end[σ])

⊃ EFDP

dpt1,do(senseφ,end[σ])

.
By a similar argument, the following is also true:
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |=
¬φ

do(senseφ,end[σ])

⊃ EFDP

dpt2,do(senseφ,end[σ])

.
Because D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= ∃sf.Do(dpt,end[σ],s f) (due to ini-
tial assumptions), D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Poss(senseφ,end[σ]) applies, and
this must be known by theorem 2, i.e., D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} logically entails
Know(Poss(senseφ,now),end[σ]). Thus, we have that
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |=
Know

Trans(dpt,now,if φ then dpt1 else dpt2,do(senseφ,now)),end[σ]

.
It is also known, because of the form of dpt, that this is the only transition possible for
program dpt and that dpt is not ﬁnal, which implies that D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |=
LEFDP(dpt,end[σ]) is true. Thus, it follows that D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |=
EFDP(dpt,end[σ]). 
Observe that as a consequence of the theorem above and theorem 7, the online
execution of dpt in σ is successfully terminating for all possible sensing outcomes. It
follows that the problem of ﬁnding a tree program that yields an execution of a program
in a deliberation block is the analogue in our framework of conditional planning (under
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Next we show a quite strong result: tree programs are sufﬁcient to express any
strategy where there is a known bound on the number of steps it needs to terminate.
That is, for any epistemically feasible deterministic program for which this condition
holds, there is a tree program that produces the same executions.
Theorem 10. For any program dp that is
1. an epistemically feasible deterministic program, i.e.,
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= EFDP(dp,end[σ]);a n d
2. such that there is a known bound on the number of steps it needs to terminate, i.e.,
where there is an n such that
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |=
∃p ,s ,k.k n ∧ Transk(dp,end[σ],p ,s ) ∧ Final(p ,s )
there exists a tree program dpt ∈ TREE such that for each model M of the set D ∪ T ∪
E ∪{ Sensed[σ]}, the complete online execution of dp from σ with respect to M and the
complete online execution of dpt from σ with respect to M successfully terminate in the
same ﬁnal history σM.
Proof. We construct the tree program dpt = m(dp,σ)from dp using the following
rules:
− m(dp,σ)= False?i fD ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} is inconsistent, otherwise
− m(dp,σ)= nil if D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Final(dp,end[σ]), otherwise
− m(dp,σ)= a;m(dp ,σ· (a,1)) iff
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Trans

dp,end[σ],dp
 ,do(a,end[σ])

for some non-sensing action a;
− m(dp,σ)= senseφ;if φ then m(dp
 ,σ· (senseφ,1))
else m(dp
 ,σ· (senseφ,0)) iff
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Trans

dp,end[σ],dp
 ,do(senseφ,end[σ])

for some sensing action senseφ;
− m(dp,σ)= True?;m(dp ,σ)iff
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Trans

dp,end[σ],dp ,end[σ]

.
It turns out that, under the hypothesis of the theorem, for all dp and all σ, (dp,σ)
is bisimilar to (m(dp,σ),σ) with respect to online executions. Indeed, it is easy to
check that the relation [(dp,σ),(m(dp,σ),σ)] is a bisimulation, i.e., for all dp and σ,
[(dp,σ),(m(dp,σ),σ)] implies that
− D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Final(dp,end[σ]) iff
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− for all dp , σ  if D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ ]} is consistent and
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Trans(dp,end[σ],dp
 ,end[σ ]),t h e n
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Trans

m(dp,σ),end[σ],m(dp
 ,σ
 ),end[σ
 ]

and [(dp ,σ ),(m(dp ,σ ),σ )];
− for all dp
 , σ  if D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ ]} is consistent and
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Trans

m(dp,σ),end[σ],m(dp
 ,σ
 ),end[σ
 ]

,
then
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Trans

dp,end[σ],dp
 ,end[σ
 ]

and [(dp ,σ ),(m(dp ,σ ),σ )].
(By the way, note that in this deﬁnition, we do not require that histories have sens-
ing values that come from a ﬁxed model of the set of axioms D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]},
only that they remain consistent with D ∪T ∪E and the sensing values already encoun-
tered. In fact, bisimulation may hold even w.r.t. sensing outcomes that are not possible
w.r.t. the set D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]}. However, for programs that always terminate
in a ﬁnite number of steps as assumed, the histories considered will always be such that
t h e r ei sam o d e lo fD ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} that generates them.)
Since by hypothesis D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]| =∃ sf.Do(dp,end[σ],s f) (in a
bounded number of steps, in fact), considering that dp is an EFDP, by theorem 7 for
all models M of D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} the (unique) online execution of dp from σ
w.r.t. M successfully terminates. Hence since (dp,σ)and (m(dp,σ),σ)are bisimilar,
m(dp,σ)has the same online execution from σ w.r.t. M (apart from the program ap-
pearing in the conﬁgurations) and the two online executions successfully terminate in
the same ﬁnal history σM. 
This theorem shows that if we restrict our attention to EFDP s that terminate in
a bounded number of steps, then we can further restrict our attention to programs of a
very speciﬁc syntactic form, without any loss in generality. This may simplify the task
of coming up with a successful strategy for a given deliberation block.
5.2. Linear programs
Let the class of linear programs LINE be deﬁned by the following BNF rule:
dpl ::= nil | a;dpl1 | True?;dpl1
where a is any non-sensing action, and dpl1 is a linear program. This class only includes
sequences of actions or trivial tests. So whenever such a plan is (physically) executable,
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Theorem 11. Let dpl be a linear program, i.e., dpl ∈ LINE. Then, for all histories σ,i f
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{Sensed[σ]} |= ∃sf.Do(dpl,end[σ],s f) then D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{Sensed[σ]} |=
EFDP(dpl,end[σ]),t h a ti s ,dpl is an EFDP at history σ.
Proof. This is a corollary of theorem 9 for tree programs. Since linear programs are
tree programs, the thesis follows immediately from this theorem. 
Again as a consequence of the theorem above and theorem 7, the online execution
of (dpl,σ)is successfully terminating for all possible sensing outcomes. Observe that
the problem of ﬁnding a linear program that yields an execution of a program in a delib-
eration block is the analogue in our framework of conformant planning in the standard
setting [31].
Next, we show that linear programs are sufﬁcient to express any strategy that does
not perform sensing.
Theorem 12. For any dp that does not include sensing actions, such that D ∪ T ∪ E ∪
{Sensed[σ]} |= EFDP(dp,end[σ]), there exists a linear program dpl such that for each
model M of D∪T ∪E ∪{Sensed[σ]}, the complete online execution of dp from σ w.r.t.
M and the complete online execution of dpl from σ w.r.t. M successfully terminate in
the same history σm.
Proof. We show this using the same approach as for theorem 10 for tree programs.
Since dp cannot contain sensing actions, the construction method used in the proof of
theorem 10 produces a tree program that contains no branching and is in fact a linear
program. Then, by the same argument as used there, the thesis follows. 
Observe that this implies that if no sensing is possible – for instance, because there
are no sensing actions – then linear programs are sufﬁcient to express every strategy.
Let  l be a deliberation operator that is axiomatized just as  e except that we
replace the requirement that dp be an epistemically feasible deterministic program by
the requirement that it be a linear program, i.e., where we use the axiom (the LINE
predicate is deﬁned in the obvious way):
Trans( l(p),s,dpl
 ,s
 ) ≡
∃dpl.LINE(dpl) ∧∃ sf.Trans(dpl,s,dpl
 ,s
 ) ∧ Do(dpl
 ,s
 ,s f) ∧ Do(p,s,s f).
Then, one can show that a program using this deliberation operator  l(p) can make a
transition in a history if and only if one can identify a sequence of actions that is an
execution of p in all models for the history:
Theorem 13. There exists a situation sf such that
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if and only if there is a dpl ∈ LINE and an s  such that
D ∪ T ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Trans( l(p),end[σ],dpl,s ).
Proof. ⇐ By hypothesis there exists a dpl that is a LINE.I fs  = end[σ] then dpl =
True?;dpl  and if s  = do(a,end[σ]), for some action a,a n dt h e ndpl = a;dpl . In both
cases dpl  must be a LINE. In every model dpl  reaches from s  a ﬁnal situation of the
original program p. Observe that such a situation will be the same in every model since
the sequence of actions starting from s  is ﬁxed by dpl . It follows that the sequence
of action done by dpl starting from s reaches a situation sf such that D ∪ T ∪ E ∪
{Sensed[σ]} |= Do(p,end[σ],s f).
⇒ If for some sf we have D∪T ∪E ∪{Sensed[σ]} |= Do(p,end[σ],s f), then the
sequence of actions from end[σ] to sf is a LINE program, which trivially satisﬁes the
right-hand-side of the axiom for  l. Observe that if sf = end[σ] then we can simply
use the linear program True?;nil to satisfy the right-hand side of the axiom for  l. 
This provides the basis for a simple implementation.
6. Implementation
Let us now examine how the deliberation construct can be implemented according
to the speciﬁcation given above, i.e., by having the interpreter look for an epistemically
feasible deterministic program of a certain type, linear, tree, etc. We also relate these
implementations to earlier implementation proposals for IndiGolog.
Instead of situations, our implementations use histories, which are lists of pairs of
actions and sensing outcomes since the initial situation. We assume the following code
is already available: (a) holds(P,H) implements the evaluation procedure and states
that formula P is true at history H;( b )trans/4 and final/2 implement relations
Trans and Final, respectively; and (c) senses(A,F) states that action A senses the
truth value of ﬂuent F.
The simplest type of implementation is one that only considers linear programs as
potential strategies for executing the program in the deliberation block, as in the speciﬁ-
cation of  l above. This will work if there is a solution that does not do sensing. Here
is the code in Prolog:
/* implementation using linear programs */
trans(delib_l(P),H,DPL1,H1) :-
buildLine(P,DPL,H), trans(DPL,H,DPL1,H1).
buildLine(P,[],H) :- final(P,H).
buildLine(P,[(true)?|DPL],H) :-
trans(P,H,P1,H), buildLine(P1,DPL,H).
buildLine(P,[A|DPL],H) :-
trans(P,H,P1,[(A,1)|H]),
not senses(A,_), /* A is not a sensing action */
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The buildLine(P,DPL,H) predicate basically looks for a sequence of transitions
that the given program P can perform in history H which is guaranteed to lead to a ﬁnal
conﬁguration; the transitions must not involve sensing actions, which would be use-
less without branching (sensing outcomes for non-sensing actions are assumed to be 1);
the sequence of transitions found is returned as a linear program DPL. This approach
to implementing deliberation is essentially that used in [7,8,14], as these assume that
deliberation blocks do not contain sensing actions.
A more general type of implementation is one that considers tree programs as po-
tential strategies for executing the program in the deliberation block, assuming that bi-
nary sensing actions are available. This can be implemented by generalizing the above
as follows:
/* implementation using tree programs */
trans(delib_t(P),H,DPT1,H1) :-
buildTree(P,DPT,H), trans(DPT,H,DPT1,H1).
buildTree(P,[],H) :- final(P,H).
buildTree(P,[(true)?|DPT],H) :-
trans(P,H,P1,H), buildTree(P1,DPT,H).
buildTree(P,[A,if(F,DPT1,DPT2)]) :-
trans(P,H,P1,[(A,_)|H]), senses(A,F),
buildTree(P1,DPT1,[(A,1)|H]),
buildTree(P1,DPT2,[(A,0)|H]).
buildTree(P,[A|DPT],H) :-
trans(P,H,P1,[(A,_)|H]), not senses(A,_),
buildTree(P1,DPT,[(A,1)|H]).
buildTree(P,(false)?,H) :- inconsistent(H).
inconsistent([(A,1)|H]) :-
senses(A,F), holds(neg(F),H) ; inconsistent(H).
inconsistent([(A,0)|H]) :-
senses(A,F), holds(F,H) ; inconsistent(H).
A transition is performed on a program delib_t(P)only if it is always possible to ex-
tend it into a complete execution of P. To ensure this, whenever a binary sensing action
is encountered, the code veriﬁes the existence of complete executions for both potential
sensing outcomes 0 and 1 (3rd clause of buildTree). For non-sensing actions, the
sensing outcome is assumed to be 1, and the existence of an execution is veriﬁed in this
single case (4th clause of buildTree). This implementation is similar to that of [5].
Both of the above implementations are sound (see [4,7] on techniques to prove this),
but not complete even assuming soundness and completeness of holds/2.T h ei n c o m -
pleteness comes from the fact that they stick to the form of the original program while
the semantics does not. One example that brings this out is: φ?;ψ?;a |¬ φ?;¬ψ?;a,
where it is known that φ ≡ ψ. For our semantics, the LINE program True?;True?;a is
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7. Deliberation with execution monitoring
So far, we have provided a formal account of plans that are suitable for an agent
capable of sensing the environment during the execution of a high-level program. We
have not addressed, though, another important feature of complex environments with
which a realistic agent needs to cope as well: exogenous actions. Intuitively, an ex-
ogenous action is an action outside the control of the agent, perhaps a natural event or
an action performed by another agent. Technically, these are primitive actions that may
occur without being part of the user-speciﬁed program. It is not hard to imagine how one
would slightly alter the deﬁnition of online execution of section 2 so as to allow for the
occurrence of exogenous actions after each legal transition. Nonetheless, an exogenous
action can potentially compromise the online execution of a deliberation block. This is
due to the fact that  e commits to a particular EFDP which can turn out to be impossi-
ble to execute after the occurrence of some interfering outside action. If there is another
EFDP that could be used instead to complete the execution of the deliberation block, we
would like the agent to switch to it.
To address this problem, the search operator deﬁned in [14] implements an exe-
cution monitoring mechanism. The idea is to recompute a search block whenever the
current plan has become invalid due to the occurrence of exogenous actions during the
incremental execution. The new search starts from the original program and situation
(this is important because often commitments are made early on in the program’s execu-
tion, and these may have to be revised when an exogenous change occurs) and ensures
that the plan produced is compatible with the already performed actions.
Based on [8,14], one can come up with a clean and abstract formalization of ex-
ecution monitoring and replanning for our epistemic version of deliberation described
in section 4.2. The idea is to avoid permanently committing to a particular EFDP.I n -
stead, we deﬁne a deliberation operator  em that monitors the execution of the selected
EFDP and replans when necessary, possibly selecting an alternative EFDP to follow.
The semantics of this monitored deliberation construct goes as follows:
Trans( em(p),s,p
 ,s
 ) ≡
∃dp,dp .EFDP(dp,s)∧ p  = mnt(dp ,s ,p,s)∧
∃sf.Trans(dp,s,dp
 ,s
 ) ∧ Do(dp
 ,s
 ,s f) ∧ Do(p,s,s f),
Final( em(p),s) ≡ Final(p,s).
The main difference is in the remaining program which contains not only the epis-
temically feasible strategy chosen, but also the original program p, original situation s,
and next expected situation s . These components are packaged using a new language
construct mnt, which basically means that the agent should monitor the execution of the
selected strategy dp using the original program and situation to replan when necessary.
The next step, then, is to deﬁne the semantics for the new “monitoring” con-
struct mnt. With that objective, we ﬁrst introduce two auxiliary relations. Relation
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in situation s by some exogenous action; pi and si represent the initial program and
initial situation from where dp comes from, whereas se represent the situation in which
program dp is expected to execute in. There are obviously several ways to deﬁne when
a strategy has been perturbed. A sensible one is the following: a strategy has been per-
turbed if the exogenous actions that just occurred rule out a successful execution for both
the strategy and the original program of the deliberation block.
perturbed(mnt(dp,s e,p i,s i),s) ≡
se  = s ∧¬ ∃ sf.

Do(dp,s,s f) ∧ Do(pi   pex,s i,s f)

.
Above we make use of the special program pex
def = (πa.Exo(a)?;a)∗ to allow for a
legal sequence of exogenous actions (see [4]). Also, observe that a strategy can be per-
turbed only if an action outside the strategy occurred, in which case the actual situation
s would differ from the expected situation se. Thus in practice, there is no need to check
for perturbation unless an exogenous action or an action other than that performed by
the chosen strategy occurs.
The next auxiliary relation is used to calculate a recovered strategy dpr when the
current one dp was perturbed in situation s. A sensible deﬁnition for it is:
recover(mnt(dp,s e,p i,s i),s,dpr) ≡
∃p 
i.Trans∗(pi   pex,s i,p 
i   pex,s)∧
EFDP(dpr,s)∧∃ sf.Do(dpr,s,s f) ∧ Do(p
 
i,s,s f).
Observe that the above deﬁnition may end up choosing an alternative epistemically
feasible strategy than the one chosen before. In a nutshell, a new recovered strategy is
an epistemically feasible one that is able to “solve” the original program pi while ac-
counting for every action executed so far, either by the deliberation block or exogenous,
since the beginning of the deliberation block.
We now have all the machinery needed to deﬁne the semantics for the monitoring
construct mnt:
Trans(mnt(dp,s e,p i,s i),s,p
 ,s
 ) ≡

¬perturbed(mnt(dp,s e,p i,s i),s) ∧
∃dp
 .Trans(dp,s,dp
 ,s
 ) ∧ p
  = mnt(dp
 ,s
 ,p i,s i)

∨

perturbed(mnt(dp,s e,p i,s i),s) ∧
∃dpr.recover(mnt(dp,s e,p i,s i),s,dpr) ∧
∃dp .Trans(dpr,s,dp ,s ) ∧ p  = mnt(dp ,s ,p i,s i)

,
Final(mnt(dp,s e,p i,s i),s) ≡

¬perturbed(mnt(dp,s e,p i,s i),s) ∧ Final(dp,s)

∨

perturbed(mnt(dp,s e,p i,s i),s) ∧ Do(pi   pex,s i,s)

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For Trans, we have two possibilities: (i) if the strategy has not been perturbed,
then we continue its execution by performing one step and updating the next expected
situation; (ii) if the strategy has just been perturbed, a recovered new strategy dpr is
computed and the execution continues with respect to this alternative strategy. It is
important to note that the original program and situation are always kept throughout
the whole execution of a deliberation block. In that way, the recovery process can be
as general as possible. The case for Final is simpler: (i) if the strategy has not been
perturbed, then we check whether the strategy is ﬁnal in the actual situation; (ii) if the
strategy has been perturbed, then there is a chance that the original program might be
terminating in the current situation and we check for this.
In summary, deliberation can be naturally integrated with execution monitoring in
order to cope with exogenous actions that make the chosen strategy unsuitable.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we developed an account of the kind of deliberation that an agent
that is doing planning or executing high-level programs under incomplete information
must be able to perform. The deliberator’s job is to produce a kind of plan that does not
itself require deliberation to interpret. We characterized these as epistemically feasible
programs: programs for which the executing agent, at every stage of execution, by virtue
of what it knew initially and the subsequent readings of its sensors, always knows what
step to take next towards the goal of completing the entire program. We formalized this
notion and characterized deliberation in the IndiGolog agent programming language in
terms of it. We have also shown that for certain classes of problems, which correspond
to conformant planning and conditional planning, the search for epistemically feasible
programs can be limited to programs of a simple syntactic form.
There has been a lot of work in the past on formalizing notions of epistemically
feasible plan and achievability of goals, e.g., [2,13,15,20], and our accounts builds on
this. However, our account differs from previous work on several aspects. First, we
model the plans that are the result of deliberation as ordinary programs that satisfy cer-
tain semantic criteria, i.e., they are epistemically feasible deterministic programs. This
means that after deliberation, such plans can be handled by the existing online executor
for the language. They do not belong to a different “plan language” as in [15], and are
not syntactically restricted as in most work on planning with incomplete information.
Our proposal differs from that in [2], in which there is no characterization of the result
of deliberation other than as a semantic object (a relation over situations), and this also
applies to [13] and most other accounts of goal achievability. Secondly, we have shown
how deliberation can be viewed as a part of agent program execution, and our semantics
for deliberation is integrated within the transition system semantics of our programming
language. Thirdly, we explained how one can also incorporate execution monitoring and
replanning to cope with a changing environment. Many agent applications require plan-
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how one can develop an agent programming language, IndiGolog, that is a convenient
tool for this.
As far as we know, the only other agent programming language that attempts to
support planning under incomplete information is FLUX [32,33]. Thielscher’s FLUX
agent programming framework supports online execution, sensing, and planning for
agents with open world knowledge bases with disjunctive formulas, with the restriction
that only ﬁnitely many facts are known to be true. It is implemented using constraint
logic programming techniques which, together with the Fluent Calculus state-based ap-
proach, yields good computational properties in terms of execution time. FLUX though,
only does a restricted form of conditional planning and no results are proven regarding
the correctness of the outcome of its deliberation mechanism. Also, the programming
framework is deﬁned somewhat informally and it is not clear exactly what range of plan-
ning problems can be handled.
McIlraith and Son [19] have used Golog to model web services and perform ser-
vice customization and composition. They also formalized a notion of “self-sufﬁcient
program” that is similar to that of an EFDPs; however their account is incomplete for
programs that involve indeﬁnite iteration (such as the tree chopping example of [13])
and more sensitive to the program’s syntax than ours. It would be interesting to evaluate
the effectiveness of IndiGolog’s planning capabilities in such applications.
Many problems and lines of research remain open. In this paper, we have only
dealt with binary sensing actions. However, the account of deliberation developed in
section 4 and its extension to provide execution monitoring in section 7 do not rely on
this restriction and apply unchanged to theories with sensing actions that have even an
inﬁnite number of possible sensing outcomes.13 This comes from the fact that our char-
acterization of “good execution strategies” through the notion of EFDP is not syntactic,
only requiring the agent to know what action to do next at every step. The results of
section 5.1 showing that tree programs are sufﬁcient to solve any planning/deliberation
problem where there is some strategy that solves the problem in a bounded number of
steps also generalize to domains involving sensing actions with non-binary but ﬁnitely
many outcomes; this is easy to see given that any such sensing action can be encoded as
a sequence binary sensing actions that read the outcome one bit at a time (one could of
course extend the class of tree programs with a non-binary branching structure to avoid
the need for such an encoding). Whether a similar characterization can be obtained for
sensing actions with an inﬁnite number of possible outcomes is an open problem. While
the above holds in principle, as soon as the number of sensing outcomes is more than
a few, conditional planning becomes impractical without advice from the programmer
as to what conditions the plan should branch on [11,32]. In [27], a search construct for
IndiGolog that generates conditional plans involving non-binary sensing actions by re-
lying on such programmer advice is developed. This approach seems very compatible
with ours and it would be interesting to formalize it as a special case of our account
of deliberation. In [28], the search operator is combined with declarative goals to pro-
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vide a planning account which mixes both procedural and declarative notions of action.
Roughly speaking, the new (rational) search operator looks for the “best” EFDP possi-
ble w.r.t. some set of (prioritized) goals. There are also more general theories of sensing,
such as that of [6] which deals with online sensors that always provide values and sit-
uations where the law of inertia is not always applicable. In [7], a search operator for
such theories is developed. It would be worthwhile examining whether this setting could
also be handled within our account of deliberation. As well, one could look for syntactic
characterizations for certain classes of epistemically feasible deterministic programs in
this setting.
Also related to the work presented here is [12], where a similar approach is used
to develop an account of epistemic feasibility for multiagent system speciﬁcations, ex-
pressed in a version of ConGolog extended with knowledge and goal attitudes. In [3], we
investigate a non-epistemic account of deliberation that is more easily related to previous
work on agent programming languages and draw some lessons.
Appendix A. Proofs
Recall from section 2 that D denotes the set of axioms deﬁning an underlying
theory of action, T denotes the set of axioms for Trans and Final,a n dE stands for the
set of axioms needed for the encoding of programs as ﬁrst-order terms (see [4]).
Also, we will be using two functions deﬁned in [25] for performing regression.
First, ρ1(φ(now),A) stands for the one-step regression of formula φ(now) through ac-
tion A. Second, ρ(φ(now),end[σ]) stands for the full regression of formula φ(now)
through situation end[σ].
For our proofs, we will be using some generalized versions of existing results
proven by Reiter [25, chapter 11]. Roughly speaking, we will be adding the set of
axioms E for the encoding of programs as ﬁrst-order terms into these existing results,
and they should still be valid as adding E only produces a conservative extension that
deﬁnes the new program sort.
We do not provide detailed proofs of these results since the proofs are long, labo-
rious, and of limited interest. But let us point out that the following three results hold
because of the following reasons: (i) program terms and variables can only be men-
tioned in objective formulas as arguments of equality terms; (ii) given that every object
and every action has a name in the language, it follows (because of E) that every pos-
sible program must have a name as well; (iii) E ∪ Duna ∪{ ψ(S0)} decides all equalities
sentences, including equality among programs, given that Duna ∪{ ψ(S0)} decides all
equalities sentences that mention no program term or variable; and (iv) it is possible
to obtain a generalized version of the “Regression Theorem with Knowledge” (theo-
rem 11.6.3 in [25]) in which E is added to the set of underlying axioms and equality
among program terms are permitted in regressable formulas. Point (iv) relies on the fact
that any model of D can be extended to satisfy E ∪D by theorem A.1 in [4], and we only
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Lemma 2 (Generalization of lemma 11.7.2 in [25]). If φ(s) is an objective formula,
then
E ∪ D |= Know(φ(now),S0) iff E ∪ KInit ∪ Duna ∪ DS0 |= Know(φ(now),S0).
Lemma 3 (Generalization of lemma 11.7.3 in [25]). If φ(s) and ψ(s) are objective
formulas, and DS0 ={ Know(ψ(now),S0)},t h e n
E ∪ D |= Know(φ(now),S0) iff E ∪ Duna ∪{ ψ(S0)}| =φ(S0).
Lemma 4 (Generalization of lemma 11.7.12 in [25]). Suppose that ψ(s) and
φ0(s),...,φn(s) are all objective formulas, that DS0 ={ Know(ψ(now),S0)},a n dt h a t
E ∪ Duna ∪ ψ(S0) decides all equality sentences. Suppose further that
E ∪ D |= φ0(S0) ∨ Know(φ1(now),S0) ∨···∨Know(φn(now),S0).
Then for some 0  i  n, E ∪ D |= Know(φi(now),S0).
A.1. Additional lemmas
Lemma 5. Let ψ(s)be an objective formula. If E ∪ Duna ∪{ ψ(S0)} is satisﬁable, then
it is satisﬁable in a model M such that for every object/action/program element d in
the object/action/program universe of M, there is an object/action/program term t in the
language such that [t]M = d.14
Proof. Forobjects and actions, the lemmafollows directly from assumptions 9(domain
closure and unique names for objects) and 8 (ﬁnitely many action types) in section 3 and
the fact that actions can only take objects as arguments. Objects are identiﬁed with a set
of well-deﬁned standard names; actions are built from (ﬁnitely many) action functions
and objects.
For programs, it follows directly from the fact that E has a second order axiom
closing the set of programs to be exactly the one constructed from primitive actions and
a ﬁnite set of language constructs (if, while, pick, etc.). 
Lemma 6 (Base case of theorem 4). Let φ(  x,s) be an objective formula with non-
situation free variables   x (that is, object, action, or program variables.) Then,
D ∪ E |= ∃   x.Know(φ(  x,now),S0) if and only if
there are ground terms   t such that D ∪ E |= Know(φ(  t,now),S0).
Proof. ⇐ This direction is trivial.
⇒ Without loss of generality, we assume   x = x.L e tto
0,to
1,...be an enumeration
of object terms, let ta
0,ta
1,...be an enumeration of action terms, and t
p
0 ,t
p
1 ,...be an
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enumeration of program terms. In general, all three enumerations will be inﬁnite as
there are inﬁnite terms that can be built from one constant and one function.
We can then simplify these enumerations by grouping terms that are seen equal
w.r.t. the underlying theory. That is, we can assume t
o
0,t
o
1,...is an enumeration of dif-
ferent equivalences classes among ground object terms such that two object terms to
i and
to
j are in the same equivalence class iff Duna ∪{ ψ(S0)}| =ti = tj. Clearly, the whole
set of object terms is perfectly partitioned because Duna ∪{ψ(S0)} decides equality over
object sentences. An analogous argument will lead us to an enumeration t
a
0,t
a
1,...of
different equivalences classes among ground action terms. Lastly, the “decides equality”
property is automatically lifted to program terms whenever we take into consideration
the set of axioms E deﬁning how program terms are built, and, therefore, we can con-
struct an enumeration t
p
0,t
p
1,...of different equivalences classes among ground program
terms.
Assume next that for every i  0, D ∪ E  |= Know(φ(ti,now),S0) where ti is
of the type of variable x (i.e., ti stands for a term in the object, action, or program
enumeration). By lemma 3, E ∪ Duna ∪{ ψ(S0)}  |= { φ(ti,S 0)},f o re v e r yi  0w h e r e
DS0 ={ Know(ψ(now),S0)}. Thus, E ∪ Duna ∪{ ψ(S0)}∪{ ¬ φ(ti,S 0)} is satisﬁable for
for every i  0. Moreover, by lemma 5, E ∪Duna ∪{ψ(S0)}∪{¬φ(ti,S 0)} is satisﬁable
in a model Mi where every element in the object, action, and program sorts has a name
in the language.
With all this, we can safely assume that, for any Mi, the object sort of Mi is DO =
{t
o
1,t
o
2,...} and that [to]Mi = to. Similarly, we can assume that the action sort of Mi
is DA ={ t
a
1,t
a
2,...} and that [ta]Mi = ta; and, ﬁnally, that the program sort of Mi is
DP ={ t
p
1,t
p
2,...} and that [tp]Mi = tp.
Intuitively, with these assumptions on the form of Mi, all models Mi will coincide
exactly on the way they interpret every term, and, therefore, we will be able to amalga-
mate all them together in a single “big” (epistemic) model.
Next, we are to show that, based on all these models M0,M 1,M 2,... (one for
each object/action/program term), we can construct an amalgamated model M∗ of E ∪
Duna∪DS0∪KInit such that the following holds: M∗ |= ¬ ∃x.Know(φ(x,now),S0).T h a t
would imply that E ∪ Duna ∪ DS0 ∪ KInit  |= ∃x.Know(φ(x,now),S0) and, by lemma 2,
D ∪ E  |= ∃x.Know(φ(x,now),S0) would follow (i.e., a contradiction).
Let us construct the model M∗ as follows:
(a) S0,S 1,S 2,...are all initial situations in the sort situation of M∗; [st]M∗
= st for
every possible situation term st;a n dM∗ |= K(u ,u)iff u = S0 and u  = Si,f o r
i  0, or u = u ;
(b) M∗’s domains for objects, actions, and programs are DO, DA,a n dDP, respectively;
(c) [to]M∗
= to, [ta]M∗
= ta,a n d[tp]M∗
= tp,t h a ti sM∗ interprets non-situation terms
as any Mi does;
(d) for any i  0, if t1,...,tn are non-situation domain elements, and P is an n-place
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(e) assign the rest arbitrarily (for instance, the interpretation of relational ﬂuents in sit-
uations other than the initial ones).
Informally, each model Mi is recast as a K-accessible initial situation in model M∗.
Notice that point (c) guarantees that for any two non-situation terms t1 and t2,
M
∗ |= t
1 = t
2 iff M
i |= t
1 = t
2 for any i  0. (A.1)
In addition, point (d) is well-deﬁned as there are no functional ﬂuents and M∗ has the
same object, action, and program sorts as each Mi.
It is not hard to see that for any objective sentence α(s), M∗ |= α(Si) iff Mi |=
α(S0) (by induction on the structure of α(s) with the base case being atomic formulas,
that is, either a relational ﬂuent or an equality term).
Next, we are to prove that M∗ |= E ∪ Duna ∪ DS0 ∪ KInit. First, M∗ |= ψ(Si) holds
for all i  0 due to Mi |= ψ(S0) and the above remark. Hence, M∗ |= ∀ s.K(s,S0) ⊃
ψ(s) and M∗ |= DS0 follows. Second, M∗ |= KInit due to point (a) above.15 Finally,
M∗ |= Duna because Mi |= Duna for all i  0 and (A.1). Third, M∗ |= E because M∗
domain for programs is DP and the interpretation of all programs in DP and program
terms in the language is exactly the same as in any Mi. Putting all together, M∗ |=
E ∪ Duna ∪ DS0 ∪ KInit.
Lastly, letusprove M∗ |= ¬ ∃x.Know(φ(x,now),S0). Giventhat Mi |= ¬ φ(ti,S 0)
and point (d) above, M∗ |= ¬ φ(ti,S i) is true for every i  0. In English, this means that
for every possible non-situation term t, there is an accessible world in which φ(t,now)
does not hold. In particular, if x is an object variable, then for every object element
to ∈ DO, there is an initial accessible situation Sto such that M∗ |= ¬ φ(to,S to);i fx
is an action variable, then for every action element ta ∈ DA, there is an initial accessi-
ble situation Sta such that M∗ |= ¬ φ(ta,S ta);a n di fx is a program variable, then for
every program element tp ∈ DP, there is an initial accessible situation Stp such that
M∗ |= ¬ φ(tp,S tp).
Therefore, since x is either an object, action, or program variable, we have that
M∗ |= ∀ x∃s.K(s,S0) ∧¬ φ(x,s). In other words, M∗ |= ¬ ∃x.Know(φ(x,now),S0);
and, hence, E ∪ Duna ∪ DS0 ∪ KInit  |= ∃x.Know(φ(x,now),S0). By lemma 2, it follows
that D ∪ E  |= ∃x.Know(φ(x,now),S0), which contradicts the initial statement. Thus,
it has to be the case that there exists some (object, action, or program correspondingly)
term t such that D ∪ E |= Know(φ(t,now),S0). 
Lemma 7 (Disjunctive and mutually exclusive knowledge with existentials). Let
φ1(s),φ2(  x,s),a n dφ3(  y,s) be three objective formulas with non-situation free vari-
ables   x and   y.I f
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |=
Know(φ1(now),end[σ]) ∨
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∃  x.Know

¬φ1(now) ∧ φ2(  x,now) ∧∀  y.¬φ3(  y,now),end[σ]

∨
∃  y.Know

¬φ1(now) ∧∀  x.¬φ2(  x,now) ∧ φ3(  y,now),end[σ]

then one of the following cases applies:
− D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Know(φ1(now),end[σ]);
− D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= ∃  x.Know(φ2(  x,now),end[σ]);
− D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= ∃  y.Know(φ3(  y,now),end[σ]).
Proof. First notice that, due to properties of knowledge we can push the existential
quantiﬁers inside the Know modality:
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |=
Know(φ1(now),end[σ]) ∨
Know

¬φ1(now) ∧∃  x.φ2(  x,now) ∧∀  y.¬φ3(  y,now),end[σ]

∨
Know

¬φ1(now) ∧∀  x.¬φ2(  x,now) ∧∃  y.φ3(  y,now),end[σ]

.
By theorem 3, D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} logically entails one of the following formulas:
(i) Know(φ1(now),end[σ]); (ii) Know(¬φ1(now) ∧∃  x.φ2(  x,now) ∧∀  y.¬φ3(  y,now),
end[σ]); or (iii) Know(¬φ1(now) ∧∀  x.¬φ2(  x,now) ∧∃  y.φ3(  y,now),end[σ]).
In the ﬁrst case, we are done easily. If (ii) applies, then by properties of knowledge
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Know(¬φ1(now),end[σ]) ∧ Know(∀  y.¬φ3(  y,now),end[σ]).
Next, by properties of knowledge, we pull out the universal quantiﬁer from inside the
Know modality and D∪E∪{Sensed[σ]} |= ∀  y.Know(¬φ3(  y,now),end[σ]) holds and,
as a result, D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= ∀  y.¬Know(φ3(  y,now),end[σ]) also holds. Then,
given the initial assumption, as the ﬁrst and the third disjunct are ruled out, the following
should hold
D ∪ E ∪{Sensed[σ]} |= ∃  x.Know

¬φ1(now)∧ φ2(  x,now)∧∀  y.¬φ3(  y,now),end[σ]

from which D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= ∃  x.Know(φ2(  x,now),end[σ]) follows directly.
Finally, case (iii) is analogous to case (ii). 
A.2. Proofs of section 3
Proof of theorem 1. We prove this by induction on the structure of p(  x),t a k i n gnil,
(β)?, and primitive actions as base cases.
Base case. Take for instance p(  x) = A(  x)where A is a primitive action. Then, we
take φf(  x,s) = φtt(  x,p ,s)= False and φta(  x,p ,a,s) =  (  x,s) ∧ p  = nil ∧ a =
A(  x),w h e r e (  x,s) is the precondition of action type A.
Take next the case where p(  x) = (β(x))?, that is a test program. Then, we take
φf(  x,s) = φta(  x,p ,a,s)= False and φtt(  x,p ,s)= β(  x,s)∧ p  = nil.
Induction step. We only show the case for sequence, pick for an action, and priori-
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Suppose p(  x) = p1(  x);p2(  x). Then, we take
φf(  x,s)=φ
p1
f (  x,s)∧ φ
p2
f (  x,s),
φtt(  x,p
 ,s)=

∃p
  .p
  = p
  ;p2(  x)∧ φ
p1
tt (  x,p
  ,s)

∨

φ
p1
f (  x,s)∧ φ
p2
tt (  x,p
 ,s)

φta(  x,p
 ,a,s)=

∃p
  .p
  = p
  ;p2(  x)∧ φ
p1
ta(  x,p
  ,a,s)

∨

φ
p1
f (  x,s)∧ φ
p2
ta(  x,p ,a,s)

where φ
pi
f (  x,s), φ
pi
ta(  x,p ,a,s) and φ
pi
tt (  x,s) for i = 1a n di = 2 come from the
induction hypothesis.
Suppose p(  x) = πa.p1(a,   x). Given that we have a ﬁnite set of action types (as-
sumption 6insection 3), wecanrewrite program p(  x)asp1(A1(  x),  x)|...|p1(An(  x),  x)
assuming A1,...,A n are all the action types available. The rest of the proof is similar
to the previous case.
Lastly, suppose that p(  x) = p1(  x)  p1(  x). Then, we take
φf(  x,s)=φ
p1
f (  x,s)∧ φ
p2
f (  x,s),
φtt(  x,p
 ,s)=

∃p
  .p
  = p
    p2(  x)∧ φ
p1
tt (  x,p
  ,s)

∨

∃p  .p  = p1(  x)  p   ∧ φ
p2
tt (  x,p  ,s)∧
¬∃p
   .φ
p1
tt (  x,p
   ,s)∨∃ aφ
p1
ta(  x,p
   ,a,s)

,
φta(  x,p
 ,a,s)=

∃p
  .p
  = p
    p2(  x)∧ φ
p1
ta(  x,p
  ,a,s)

∨

∃p  .p  = p1(  x)  p   ∧ φ
p2
ta(  x,p  ,a,s)∧
¬∃p
   .φ
p1
tt (  x,p
   ,s)∨∃ aφ
p1
ta(  x,p
   ,a,s)

where φ
pi
f (  x,s) φ
pi
ta(  x,p ,a,s),a n dφ
pi
tt (  x,s) for i = 1a n di = 2 come from the
induction hypothesis. Note that this relies on the fact that
D ∪ T ∪ E |= ∃p
 ,s
 Trans(p,s,p
 ,s
 ) ≡∃ p
 Trans(p,s,p
 ,s)∨
∃p
 ,aTrans(p,s,p
 ,do(a,s))
which follows from D ∪ T ∪ E |= Trans(p,s,p ,s ) ⊃ s  = s ∨∃ a, s  = do(a,s).T h e
latter is easy to prove by induction on programs.
Proof of theorem 2. ⇐ This way follows easily from the fact that reﬂexivity of K
propagates through action from the initial situation.
⇒ We prove this direction by induction on the length of σ. For the base case,
take σ to be the initial history and suppose D ∪ E |= φ(S0) holds. Then, DS0 ∪ KInit ∪
E ∪ Duna |= φ(S0) (i.e., Dap,Dss,Dsf and the foundational axioms can all be ignored
since the formula in question only talks about S0). Then, DS0 ∪ KInit ∪ E ∪ Duna ∪
{ψ(S0)}| =φ(S0),w h e r eDS0 = Know(ψ(now),S0). Finally, since φ(S0) is objective
on the initial situation S0, we can safely drop both DS0 and KInit and, hence, obtain that
E ∪ Duna ∪{ ψ(S0)}| =φ(S0). At this point, we can directly appeal to lemma 3.294 S. Sardina et al. / On the semantics of deliberation in IndiGolog
Assume next that σ+ = σ · (A,µ) for some ground action A and history σ of
length k. Consider the case where A = senseψ(  t) and µ = 1. Then Sensed[σ+]=
Sensed[σ]∧ψ(  t,end[σ]).W eﬁ r s th a v et h a t
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ+]} |= φ(end[σ+]).
By the successor state axioms, it follows that
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ
+]} |= ρ
1
φ(now),senseψ(  t)

(end[σ]).
Since Sensed[σ+]=Sensed[σ]∧ψ(  t,end[σ]),
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= ψ(  t,end[σ]) ⊃ ρ
1
φ(now),senseψ(  t)

(end[σ]).
By the induction hypothesis, we then have that
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Know

ψ(  t,now) ⊃ ρ1
φ(now),senseψ(  t)

,end[σ]

and thus also that
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ
+]} |= Know

ψ(  t,now) ⊃ ρ
1
φ(now),senseψ(  t)

,end[σ]

.
Then by proposition 11.6.2 in [25],
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ+]} |= Know(φ(now),end[σ+]).
The case where A = senseψ(  t)and µ = 0 is similar.
Now consider the case where A is a non-sensing action. Then, we know that µ = 1
and Dsf |= Sensed[σ+]≡Sensed[σ].W eﬁ r s th a v et h a t
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ+]} |= φ(end[σ+]).
By the successor state axioms, it follows that
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ
+]} |= ρ
1(φ(now),A)(end[σ]).
Since Dsf |= Sensed[σ+]≡Sensed[σ],
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= ρ1(φ(now),A)(end[σ]).
By the induction hypothesis, we then have that
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Know(ρ
1(φ(now),A),end[σ])
and thus also that
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ+]} |= Know(ρ1(φ(now),A),end[σ]).
Then by proposition 11.6.1 in [25], we ﬁnally conclude that
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ
+]} |= Know(φ(now),end[σ
+]).
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⇒ For simplicity, we prove this for two disjuncts, that is for n = 2. The proof can
be easily extended to an arbitrary n.
The proof goes by induction on the length of the history. The base case, that is,
when σ is the initial history, follows from lemma 4.
Next, assume that the theorem holds for any history σ of length  k. Suppose
that σ+ = σ · (A,1) for some ground action A and history σ of length k (the case for
σ+ = σ · (A,0) is similar). Suppose further that
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ
+]} |= Know(φ1(now),end[σ
+]) ∨ Know(φ2(now),end[σ
+]).
Using proposition 11.6.2 in [25], the fact that σ+ = σ · (A,1), and the fact that
Sensed[σ+]=Sensed[σ]∧ψ(end[σ]) we conclude the following:
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ+]} |=
Know(φ1(now),end[σ+]) ≡ Know

ψ(now) ⊃ ρ1(φ1(now),A),end[σ]

, (A.2)
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ+]} |=
Know(φ2(now),end[σ+]) ≡ Know

ψ(now) ⊃ ρ1(φ2(now),A),end[σ]

. (A.3)
Therefore,
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ+]}|=Know

ψ(now) ⊃ ρ1(φ1(now),A),end[σ]

∨
Know

ψ(now) ⊃ ρ
1(φ2(now),A),end[σ]

. (A.4)
In addition, by lemma 11.7.10 in [25], there is an objective formula ψ∗(now)
(ψ∗(now) = ρ(Sensed[σ],end[σ]) ⊃ ρ(ψ,end[σ])) such that
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ
+]} |= Know(ψ(now),end[σ]) ≡ Know(ψ
∗(now),S0). (A.5)
In other words, coming to know that ψ holds at history σ is equivalent to coming to
know that ψ∗ holds initially.
Next, we deﬁne D∗ to be like D, but with ψ∗(now) added to the the initial data-
base DS0,t h a ti s ,i fDS0 ={ Know(ψ0(now),S0)} then D∗
S0 ={ Know(ψ0(now) ∧
ψ∗(now),S0)}. Let us argue that D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ+]} and D∗ ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]}
are equivalent sets of axioms. First, observe that given that D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ+]} |=
ψ(end[σ]),t h e nD ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ+]} |= Know(ψ(now),end[σ]) applies due to the-
orem 2. By (A.5), D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ+]} |= Know(ψ∗(now),S0). Thus, D ∪ E ∪
{Sensed[σ+]} logically entails D∗ ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]}.
Moreover, by lemma 11.7.10 in [25], we know that the following holds:
D
∗ ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Know(ψ(now),end[σ]) ≡ Know(ψ
∗(now),S0)
and because D∗ ∪ E |= Know(ψ∗(now),S0), we conclude that
D
∗ ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Know(ψ(now),end[σ]).
Using theorem 2 we get that
D
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and D∗ ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ+]} applies. Hence, it is the case that
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ+]} and D∗ ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} are equivalent sets of axioms.
As a consequence of this and (A.4) the following holds:
D∗ ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]}|=Know

ψ(now) ⊃ ρ1(φ1(now),A),end[σ]

∨
Know

ψ(now) ⊃ ρ
1(φ2(now),A),end[σ]

.
Given that ψ∗(now), ψ(now) ⊃ ρ1(φ1(now),A),a n dψ(now) ⊃ ρ1(φ2(now),A) are
objective, and that σ is of length k, we can apply the induction hypothesis: hence, one
of the following two cases holds:
(i) D∗ ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Know(ψ(now) ⊃ ρ1(φ1(now),A),end[σ]),
(ii) D∗ ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Know(ψ(now) ⊃ ρ1(φ2(now),A),end[σ]).
Assume (i) holds. Again, as D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ+]} and D∗ ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} are
equivalent sets of axioms, we get
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ+]} |= Know

ψ(now) ⊃ ρ1(φ1(now),A),end[σ]

.
By proposition 11.6.2. in [25] and (A.2) above,
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ
+]} |= Know(φ1(now),end[σ
+]).
The case for (ii) is similar and the theorem follows.
Proof of theorem 4. ⇐ This direction is trivial.
⇒ The proof goes by induction on the length of the history. The base case, that is,
when σ is the initial history, corresponds to lemma 6 above.
Assume that the theorem holds for any history σ of length  k. Suppose that
σ+ = σ · (A,1) for some ground action A and history σ of length k (the case for
σ+ = σ · (A,0) is analogous.) Suppose further that
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ
+]} |= ∃  x.Know(φ(  x,now),end[σ
+]).
From proposition 11.6.2 in [25], the fact that σ+ = σ · (A,1), and the fact that
Dsf |= Sensed[σ+]≡Sensed[σ]∧ψ(end[σ]),w eh a v et h a t
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ+]} |=
∃  x.Know

φ(  x,now),end[σ+]

≡∃ x.Know

ψ(now) ⊃ ρ1(φ(  x,now),A),end[σ]

.
(A.6)
Therefore,
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ
+]} |= ∃x.Know

ψ(now) ⊃ ρ
1(φ(  x,now),A),end[σ]

. (A.7)
In addition, by lemma 11.7.10 in [25], there is some formula ψ∗(now) (ψ∗(now) =
ρ(Sensed[σ],end[σ]) ⊃ ρ(ψ,end[σ])) such that
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ
+]} |= Know(ψ(now),σ) ≡ Know(ψ
∗(now),S0). (A.8)S. Sardina et al. / On the semantics of deliberation in IndiGolog 297
In other words, coming to know that ψ holds at history σ is equivalent to coming to
know that ψ∗ holds initially.
Next, we deﬁne D∗ to be like D, but with ψ∗(now) added to the the initial data-
base DS0,t h a ti s ,i fDS0 ={ Know(ψ0(now),S0)} then D∗
S0 ={ Know(ψ0(now) ∧
ψ∗(now),S0)}. As demonstrated in the proof of theorem 3, the sets of axioms
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ+]} and D∗ ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} are logically equivalent.
As a consequence of that and equation (A.7) the following holds:
D
∗ ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= ∃x.Know

ψ(now) ⊃ ρ
1(φ(  x,now),A),end[σ]

.
Given that both ψ∗(now) and ψ(now) ⊃ ρ1(φ(  x,now),A) are objective formulas and
σ is of length k, we can apply the induction hypothesis; thus, there exist ground terms   t
such that
D
∗ ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} |= Know

ψ(now) ⊃ ρ
1(φ(  t,now),A),end[σ]

.
Since D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ+]} and D∗ ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ]} are equivalent,
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ
+]} |= Know

ψ(now) ⊃ ρ
1(φ(  t,now),A),end[σ]

.
From proposition 11.6.2 in [25], the fact that σ+ = σ · (A,1), and the fact that
Dsf |= Sensed[σ+]≡Sensed[σ]∧ψ(end[σ]), we conclude that
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ+]} |=
Know

φ(  t,now),end[σ
+]

≡ Know

ψ(now) ⊃ ρ
1(φ(  t,now),A),end[σ]

and, therefore, the following is true:
D ∪ E ∪{ Sensed[σ
+]} |= Know

φ(  t,now),end[σ
+]

.
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